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"DEFINITIVE,"
"EXHAUSTIVE,"
AND
RATHER OLD-FASHIONED"
Scholarly Biography
on the
Cusp of Critical Change
Catherine N. Parke

JW

he question driving this essay is "Do we need a new
rlifeofSamuelRichardsonto—fill in the blank—revise?
^
replace? succeed? T. C. Duncan Eaves and Ben D.
Kimpel's self-described "definitive," "exhaustive." and "rather oldfashioned" Samuel Richardson [:] A Biography (1971)?' Let me say at the
outset that my aim is not to discover the right answer, yes or no, as
such. This is not the kind of question intended to disappear into its
correct solution. It is a heuristic question of ongoing usefulness and
even necessity to biography that should be applied regularly by at least
every generation of readers. The practice of life writing, more so,
perhaps, than any other genre, relies fundamentally on lucid,
continuous, and responsible examination and self-examination for
reasons that Samuel Johnson identified in the mid-eighteenth century
and Sigmund Freud subsequently adopted and recast in the twentieth
century. I will return to these two figures shortly.
' T. C. Duncan Eaves and Ben D. Kinapel, Samuel Richardson [:] A Biography (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971). All subsequent references will be cited parenthetically in the text.
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Because my question is heuristic, its aim being to move us to
rethink issues central to the nature and practice of Eaves and Kimpel's
Richardson, in particular, and modern life writing, in general, I might
even propose an answer in advance of my inquiry, a waffling
without spoiling its value and usefulness. With regard to Richardson
this non-answer is a fairly safe bet because his work has proved to be
responsive to and enlivened by late twentieth-century revolutions in
critical theory and practice, and thus he seems to be a likely candidate
for a new life. This likelihood gives to my heuristic question an edge
of appealing immediacy and practicality, a combination that is
simultaneously true to the distinctively interwoven alliance of theory
and practice in life writing. In the course of applying this question
about the need for a new hfe of Richardson, I will examine Eaves and
Kimpel's representation of Richardson, their subject, and themselves,
his biographers, in conjunction with some of the issues defining modern
life writing and the fortunes of literary studies in the generation after
this biography. Thus the main purpose of my initial question is to
historicize all parties involved in Eaves and Kimpel's contract: their
subject, themselves, and us, their readers, who now span a generation
plus.

^ Biography's Contract of Longevity:
Human Nature, Historical Difference,
and the Examined Life ^
As prologue to turning to Eaves and Kimpel's Richardson, I want to
consider briefly some of the stakes involved in successive/successor lives
of the same biographical subject. This topic efficiently gathers key
issues of the poetics of modern life writing, beginning with the nature
of this genre's longevity that distinguishes it from another of the
modern era's defining modes of inquiry, scientific investigation.
Biographies characteristically have a longer shelf life than reports
of scientific findings, in the punningly meaningful sense of this
metaphor: they remain on library shelves literally longer than old
science books. Scientific discoveries, once corrected, refuted, or
significantly revised, typically go out with the trash of error. Except for
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the specialized, inquiring eyes of historians of science, these data hold
little interest for or use to practicing scientists. Biographies (serious
ones), on the other hand, age less radically, because their initial contract
with readers does not include the clause of abdication in light of future
discoveries; though responsible biographers stand ready to amend or
revise lives according to new evidence. Unlike modern science's
contract of replaceability, biography's contract is premised on
longevity. Thus while we want new science to replace old science,
because we believe/posit radical improvement and replaceability to be
the fundamental relationship between past and present in this area of
inquiry, we do not typically want new lives wholly to replace old lives.
The progress model does not constitutively define the theory and
practice of life writing in the way that we have made it define modern
science. We may expect and even require a new biography to provide
either new facts or new ways of seeing old facts or different contexts for
defining the old facts of the subject. Presumably we believe that such
innovations, when well founded, may even improve upon past
knowledge. But the validity of these improvements is neither thereby
imderstood to depend on, nor is it their function to require obliteration
of, contending predecessors.
None of these foregoing observations is original. One might say
that my remarks could have been condensed into a single sentence
about the defining difference between humanistic study and scientific
inquiry. But because these are foundational, if familiar, observations,
they are perennially noteworthy, never go without saying, and remain
energizingly informative when applied as questions. Furthermore, to
complicate the issue a bit in relation to actual life writing, it must be
admitted that biographies do, in fact, age because, perhaps foremost
among all the reasons, their methods and assumptions are inevitably
part and parcel of their era's economy of belief. One era's fundamental
beliefs often become, for the next era, either superstition or prime
candidate for exhibition in the museum of antiquated ideas.
Here again the story begins to grow complicated in yet another
way, a complication grounded in the fact that the paradigm of modern
biography has at stake two principal beliefs: one in human nature, the
other in historical difference. The fortunes of this pair of beliefs have
made an intricate and shifting pattern of alliances from the eighteenth
century to the late twentieth. This pattern has served as a frame for the
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principal intellectual narrative of the modern period until the last third
of the twentieth century when it was significantly revised.
Belief in an aggregate of perennially recognizable qualities that has
gone by the name of human nature has underwritten the genre of life
writing since the eighteenth century. Johnson's observations in his
Rambler essay on biography are the most succinct and familiar
formulation: "We are all prompted by the same motives, all deceived
by the same fallacies, all animated by hope, obstructed by danger,
entangled by desire, and seduced by pleasure."^ This idea of human
nature, at least as it has functioned in biography, is less an existential,
ontological, or philosophical belief about human beings (which is the
way its critics perceive it) than a working premise, even of revisionist
lives, about communicability through imaginative projection. Without
this belief in and on behalf of communicability, this form seems to be
impossible—at least based on evidence of how most biographies operate.
Again Johnson is a touchstone for this pragmatic insight about human
nature as the working premise about communicability among all parties
in the biographical contract (biographer, subject, and reader): "All joy
or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an act
of the imagination, that realizes the event however fictitious, or
approximates it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the
condition of him whose fortune we contemplate; so that we feel, while
the deception lasts, whatever motions would be excited by the same
good or evil happening to ourselves."'
Coinciding with this resilient practical belief in human nature as
precondition of mutual interest and comprehension has been the
equally strong belief (perceived as being either opposite or
complementary, depending on one's viewpoint) that there are real
differences in and throughout time and place. Hence the need always
to historicize, which is to say to avoid transcendental, transtemporal,
trans-anything categories. This belief defines the crucial need for and
distinctive value of primary materials (letters, diaries, memoirs, and
other firsthand accounts of, by, or related to the biographical subject)
for revealing and hence representing a life. It also posits simultaneously

^ Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, ed. W.J. Bate and Albrecht B.Strauss, vol. 3 of the Yale Edition
of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 320.
' Johnson, Rambler, 318-19.
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the true difficulties (and pleasures) of trying to understand these
materials, which is to say the obscurities, ruptures, blindnesses, in short,
the in communicability endemic to this undertaking.
These twinned beliefs in human nature and historical difference,
under scrutiny by the dominant critical and theoretical modes of the
late twentieth century, have appeared to be a contradictory, naive, or
hegemonic pair. Students of cultural studies, deconstruction, and some
feminisms perceive the notion of human nature to be incommensurable
with belief in historical difference. Readers and writers of biography
have typically retained both beliefs, perhaps for no more exalted reason
than, as already suggested, the seeming necessity of their paradoxical
alliance as a working premise for writing and reading lives.
This speculation aside, the fact remains that old biographies are
neither dispensable with nor disposable in the same way as old science.
Take, for instance, Isobel Grundy's Mary Wortley Montagu (1999) in
relation to its chief predecessor, Robert Halsband's Life of Mary Wortley
Montagu (1956). Halsband's revisionist innovation was to move
Montagu out of the shadow of Pope's and Walpole's personally hostile
and generally misogynist accounts of her as a dissolute and profligate
woman, the image that had dominated her representation. Any revision
as fundamental as Halsband's representation of Montagu ironically
becomes difficult to perceive, much less to appreciate, in direct
proportion to the degree of its innovation. It all but disappears by
becoming the consensual, one might even say commonsensical, base of
future work. Even when a subsequent life builds positively on and
explicitly acknowledges the foundational revision achieved by its
predecessor, as does Grundy's, the condition preceding that revision
either is nearly impossible to believe or appears so benighted as to
devalue the worth and difficulty of its revision.
Thus by the very nature of biographical succession, a kind of
supplanting occurs, both structural and substantive, even though, as is
evident in Grundy's dedication to Husband, the biographer does not
wish to usurp but to add to the preceding life. The predecessor may
continue to be admired, but it will almost certainly be read less often,
if at all. When read, it will almost certainly be read differently than
before, perhaps as stepping-stone to the current improved life or, in
reverse temporality, as a kind of supplement or subsidiary life in
relation to the current primary life.
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Montagu, as depicted by Grundy, seems to be a figure whose time
has come, a conventional reception (along with, "It is high time for..."
or "The time is ripe for...") that greets a successful new biography. The
authority and authenticity of Grundy's Montagu draw their logic and
motive from the assumptions, aims, and methods of twentieth-century
feminist and gynocentric scholarship and criticism. Grundy refocuses
her subject, in a totalizing way, through the lens of biological and
cultural femaleness and womanhood in relation to the subject's
profound commitment to a life of writing. The power of this refocusing
is amplified by and echoed in the biographer's identity as a career-long
woman writer and feminist scholar. In the final section of this essay, I
will speculate on the probable kind of successor biography to Eaves and
Kimpel's Richardson.
By way of concluding these overview remarks on modern
biography's contract with the reader let me return briefly, as promised,
to Johnson and Freud, from whom modern biography descends, and
their views on biography and the biographer's task. They agree that the
central, defining, and multi-layered task of biography is a continuous,
searching, skeptical examination of subject and self. Identifying and
avoiding the possible pitfalls of deception and self-deception are, to
borrow a term from Gaston Bachelard, biography's defining coefficient
d'adversite [coefficient of adversity].'* Any project's coefficient of
adversity is the dramatic challenge for achieving success that it
represents for its practitioners and the scale for measuring the value and
satisfaction that it issues to its audience. In the case of modern
biography, this coefficient is calibrated to measure success in achieving
continuous examination and self-examination of and by all participants
in the biographical contract. If the unexamined life is not worth living,
so, too, the unexamined biography is not worth writing or reading; the
un-self-examined biographer may be suspected of insufficient
preparation to undertake a life, and the reader who does not take the
opportunity for self-examination inscribed in this form fails to
understand its distinguishing function.
These biographical poetics were first defined by Johnson in the
mid-eighteenth century. He asserted this form to be, if written
' Gaston Bachelard, L 'Eau et les Rives; Essai sur I'imagination de la matiere, nouvelle edition
(Paris: Librairie Jose Corti, 1947), 213.
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responsibly and read with critical alertness, which is to say with
mindful awareness of purpose and practice, the most useful of all genres.
This mindfulness requires particular alertness to the variety of
distinctive error and misconception of purpose, substance, and form
that sabotage biography's potential use. These errors include a
mistakenly narrow notion of the pool of appropriate subjects and a
blurring of the formal, material, and hence methodological differences
between biography and history. Johnson corrects the former error by
noting expansively that "there has rarely passed a life of which a
judicious and faithful account would not be useful." He corrects the
latter error by distinguishing clearly between "the general and rapid
narratives of history [which] afford few lessons applicable to private
life" and biography's distinctively different pace and subject matter that
"lead the thoughts into domestick privacies." "Domestick privacies"
signify for Johnson the intimate pattern of meaningful details embodied
in "incidents...of a volatile and evanescent kind" that are expressive of
true and essential character.^
Freud remapped Johnson's larger mapping of "domestick
privacies" onto an enlargement close-up of sexual maturation and
differentiation. He correspondingly redefined Johnson's more
rangingly searching skeptical inquiry into the more highly focused
psychoanalytic imperative of exposure. This imperative of exposure,
particularly with regard to sexual identity (Freud's metonymy for
human nature and self-differentiation into adulthood), becomes the
defining coefficient of adversity in his paradigm of biography.
Biographers' success is measured by the degree of their refusal to be
bullied into regressive immaturity by codes of self-perjuring reticence
and repressive respect.
Eaves and Kimpel write in the Johnsonian line of biography,
grounded in a notion of agency, that integrates ethical responsibility,
emotional commimicability, and applied usefulness. Freud is, on
balance, their nemesis for his reduction of the notion of agency and
hence over-emphasis on determinism as the basis of (and explanation
for) the creative process. They attribute to psychoanalytic literary
criticism most of the serious misreadings of Richardson and his fiction.

Johnson, ^amWer, 319-23.
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Yet writing in the wake of Freud, they recognize that they cannot avoid
him and that indeed the better tack is to invoke some of his notions.
They implement this recognition by, foremost among their strategies,
presenting Richardson's contemporaries as ideal readers of his fiction
and himself. They locate a tactical version of Freud's ideal of sexual
maturity in these eighteenth-century readers whose accepting and
appreciative comprehension of Richardson's project—his cross-gendered
inquiry into psychosexual behavior, the complex drama of sexuality
with and among his characters and between his characters and himself
(Pamela and Clarissa, in particular)—needs no improvement.
An instructive analogue to Eaves and Kimpel's Richardson is
Lytton Strachey's Eminent Victorians (1918). This odd couple pair of
biographies—one scholarly and long, the other essayistic and
brief—combine in reverse proportions the Johnsonian and Freudian
lines of biography. They both invoke autobiography and the
biographers' personal passion as the defining quality at their respective
cores. Strachey applies psychoanalysis as his predominant method to
depict the lives and inner drives of four Victorian culture hero/ines
(Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, and General
Gordon). He does not contract with the reader to be definitive,
exhaustive, and old-fashioned, as do Eaves and Kimpel. Strachey's brief,
eccentric lives are self-announcedly subjective, partial, and innovative.
Their psychoanalytically based contract with the reader proposes as its
coefficient of adversity the biographer's proving himself to be a mature
and unenthralled adult in relation to powerful, mythic parent figures.
Yet Strachey also invokes the Johnsonian biographical insight that the
child's successful agon with parent figures does not preclude gratitude
and admiration. Thus he constructs a sturdily complex and positive
iconoclasm, rarely appreciated for these nuances, by weaving into
Freudian methodology one strand of Johnson's biographical thinking.

^ Eaves and Kimpel's
Contract with the Reader ^
Biographers inevitably depict themselves, if with varying degrees of
lucidity and self-awareness, in the lives they write. By its nature, which
is to say one of the reasons for which this form seems' to have been
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created, biography involves telling/reading someone else's story to
mirror self yet also to remain distinctly separate from self. Too much
merging of the biographer/reader and subject, too little examination of
these intersecting yet separate sites, ruins this desired complex
experience by reneging on one of the defining rules of modern
biography.
The conventional biographical contract involves one biographer
and one subject. Less frequent, though not uncommon, are biographers
who write about plural subjects, as for instance, pairs (Charles and
Diana), groups (the Boy Scouts), or collectives (the Irish). Eaves and
Kimpel's joint authorship of Richardson is uncommon in the history of
life writing. When the pronoun we appears in this life of Richardson,
there is an actual, self-enunciating pair whose position, in several senses
of the -word position, is represented.
My point in underscoring the referential reality of this pronoun is
to begin to turn our attention to the ways in which the notion and
enactment of authorial agency of all three principals (Eaves, Kimpel,
and Richardson) function as agenda, argument, and device for
structuring this narrative. Eaves and Kimpel's actual we accumulates,
by repetition throughout this long volume, evidentiary, symbolic, and
polemical weight on behalf of agency in the creative process. It
embodies and enacts their critique of psychoanalytically and culturallyhistorically based theories of criticism and creativity that contradict the
four main tenets of their poetics of biography and contract with the
reader: free will, identity, agency, and hence individual achievement.
For most postmodern or post-postmodern readers, at least those in the
academy, scarcely any issues are more vexed, when treated seriously, or
more condescended to, when treated dismissively, than these.
Symptoms of this vexedness and condescension were beginning to
become apparent in Eaves and Kiimpel's generation. And by virtue of
events in theory and criticism that they could not fully have foreseen,
including the onset of poststructuralism, postmodernism, and cultural
studies, these symptoms became fully manifest in the next generation.
Eaves and Kimpel summarize their insight into this phenomenon
(perhaps encode is a better word to suggest no small degree of
calculation and overdetermination on their part) in the phrase "oldfashioned." They use this phrase repeatedly to characterize their
methods and also by inference to depict themselves. This adjective
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becomes, by its repetition, a self-denominated epithet for the
biographer-characters' anti-Freudian agenda to reassert and reinsert
Richardson as central figure in his own life and creative process. This
reassertion, in turn, both justifies and is justified by their including
substantial excerpts from his autobiographical writings and
interpretations and assessments of Richardson by contemporaries whose
astuteness they assert at the outset: "[I]n our opinion, Richardson's first
readers on the whole understood fairly well what he was doing and
grasped his real merits" (vii). These primary documents are presented as
models of accurate reading to be emulated by subsequent readers.
Eaves and Kimpel's life of Richardson is nearly 750 pages long. Its
size, combined with the biographers' promise to provide a "definitive"
and "exhaustive" account of Richardson (vii), creates contractual
expectations of objectivity and impersonality. But the we that guides
and travels along with the reader for the duration of this life is also a
presence with personality, reminiscent compositely of some familiar
eighteenth-century author-personae-narrators:
Henry Fielding's
companionable narrator, in TomJones; Tobias Smollett's irascible letterwriter, Matthew Bramble, in Humphrey Clinker; and Johnson's ideal
conversational intelligence, in the Lives of the Poets, among them. To
accompany the primary biographical narrative Eaves and Kimpel create
a second life story, narrated in the first person plural, a kind of scholars'
memoir sung in harmony with the melody of Richardson's life and
achievement. This memoir narrates their engagement with Richardson,
in general, and with Clarissa and Pamela, in particular. It also provides
hints for an explanation for why, how, and from what sources these
scholars might have drawn energy to support a project of such length
and painstakingness, namely fascination, not to say obsession and
fantasy, with and about Richardson and his female characters. Clarissa,
they argue, is the centerpiece of Richardson's corpus. Hence this novel
is not only the centerpiece of this biography, but also the only
imaginable motive for any reader's seeking out this biography. This
novel, located at the autobiographical crossroads of Richardson's
creative process, his biographers'scholarly project and personal passion,
and the reader's motive, thus becomes a complex site of all the
participants' autobiographical energy and curiosity.
Eaves and Kimpel's we directs everything in their representation
of Richardson's life to and from Clarissa, which serves simultaneously
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to withhold and express the mystery and meaning of his life and
creative process. They dramatize this paradox in the following series of
assertions—assertions that critique psychoanalysis and by inference all
other deterministic methods—of the biographers' non-authority:
"Nothing that we know of Richardson's life or of his character and
nothing we find in his letters or his earlier books adequately prepares m
for Clarissa" (255, my emphasis). Here the biographers make an
important foundational statement of their belief in the kinds of cause
and effect possible and impossible to discover.
The first two we^s refer to themselves; the third instance, us,
broadens to include, invoke, or enforce, as the case may be, the reader's
experience. The complex tone and substance of the biographers' selfpresentation of non-authority dramatize the gap they perceive between
external historical knowledge posited as cause and the interior resources
of an author's creativity perceived, when externalized in productions,
as effect. By invoking the reader's presumably similar experience of
finding Clarissa to be an unpredictable achievement, if analysis is based
merely on positive evidence of Richardson's life to date and prior work,
they confirm a fundamental relationship between scholarly inquiry and
common reading. This relationship, grounded in the notion of agency,
serves, in turn, as the defining principle of their poetics of biography.
To reduce biographical authority over primary materials and revise
its conventional promise to create an explanatory narrative of the
subject's life in relation to his or her work is potentially risky business.
Eaves and Kimpel strategically calculate rhetorical surprise in their
series of negations. These negations that potentially pull the rug out
from under their whole enterprise make two assertions crucial to their
project. First, they distill into a single sentence, dramatically, yet also
with an almost offhand common-readerly mixture of confidence and
informality, the central informing premises and methods of this
biography that are pro-identity-creativity-agency and anti-deterministicFreudian-socio-historical. Second, they create the tacit necessity for
lengthy and substantive citations from Richardson's autobiographical
writings combined with, on the biographers' part, lengthy close
readings of the major novels, with particular emphasis on Clarissa.
Thereby the biographers invoke bothformalist criticism's interiorizing
focus on the autotehc text and scholarship's exteriorizing commitment
to the primary materials of history. This yoking of methods might well

350

1650-1850

have been suspect during the balance of Eaves and Kimpel's early
professional years and into the period of their long work on Richardson
(1957-71). But it is crucial to their project's grounding in agency and
hence its construction of the previously mentioned three sites of
autobiography as method, evidence, and narrative theme.
Throughout their discussion of Clarissa, Eaves and Kimpel
continue to take calculated risks that invoke, instruct, test, and flatter
their readers, all to the end of making Clarissa, first, md Pamela,second,
both the questions they pose and the answers they propose in (and to)
the life of Richardson. Consider the following three instances that
combine deference to Richardson with a proprietary authority over
both him and the reader:
(1)
"The only way to get to know Richardson at his best is to
read Clarissa, and to read it unabridged....And Clarissa is not
a novel to race through." Here the syntax encompasses
several overlapping assertions about Clarissa as (i) metonymy
for its creator; (ii) textual precursor of this biography; (iii)
source of the biographers' fascination; and (iv) prerequisite
reading for any reader of this life. Having renounced no
small degree of scholarly authority to explain the causes of
art. Eaves and Kimpel proceed to identify and claim other
forms and sources of biographical authority. Among these
are the inferable question, "Have you read Clarissa}"
aimounced as assumption earlier in the biography and
restated at the outset of the central chapter on this novel; and
the teacherly instructions about how to read this novel
"whole and slowly." They also hint at the author's
imaginative identification with his principal character, in the
phrase "to get to know Richardson...read Clarissa," an issue
that recurs throughout this life whenever Eaves and Kimpel
criticize deformations of Richardson's fiction by
psychoanalytic criticism. (235, 236)

"Eaves and Kimpel" Special Feature
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"To prove our view of the book is hardly possible without
quoting hundreds of pages of it. We can only ask the reader
to form his own impression, without preconceptions" (602).
This statement is curious to contemplate. Is it threat or
promise, comical or logical, or some combination? What
would it mean to quote "hundreds of pages" of Clarissa as
evidence? How much would be enough, in light of the earlier
mentioned error of reading an abridgement, if not the whole?
Imagine a biography that encompassed a complete quotation
of the author's works as proof of the biographers'
argument—one way of ensuring the novel's being read. Yet
this excess also serves to underscore two serious points,
namely the priority and precursor status of Richardson's
novels in this biography and the essential need for full
participation by the reader.
(3)
"In imaginative literature one must distinguish between the
'moral' of a book and its effect. The moral or meaning is
drawn from the book, the effect is in it. Diderot, speaking of
Richardson, saw the great advantage of this sort of fiction: 'I
felt that I had gained experience [acquis de I'experience].' It
is our opinion that the 'meaning' of Clarissa is the experience
which the reader has while he reads the book" (280). This
topography of imaginative literature, in general, applied to
Clarissa, in particular, enacts the ground rule of agency in
Eaves and Kimpel's poetics of biography.
Agency
underwrites the equally authoritative value of sources
contemporary with the biographical subject (here Diderot),
and subsequent readers, including specialized readers (trained
professionals such as themselves) and anyone else who takes
the time and trouble to read the primary texts. This passage
redefines the notion of meaning. It is first identified as the
"moral" which is "drawn from the book," and hence can exist
separate from it. Meaning is then transformed into the
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"experience" of reading the book, an event both inseparable
from the text itself, yet impossible without a notion of
agency. This redefinition produces, in turn, active revision of
both formalist criticism's model of the autotelic text (which
makes biographies of writers, as writers, all but impossible)
and historical scholarship's model of temporal-circumstantial
cause and effect (which all but excludes the writers' writing)
in order to make them a collaborative pair.

Let me conclude this discussion of Eaves and Kimpel's contract
with the reader by citing two brief, interrelated passages in which the
biographers assert what they are not doing and the methods they are not
applying, namely psychoanalysis and deterministic historical-cultural
analysis. Clarification of what is not being done is important for
biographers to make (not to mention teachers, parents, and doctors,
among others) in order to help define what they are attempting to do.
The first passage appears early in their discussion of Pamela: "[W]e
do not intend to psychoanalyse [sic] Richardson, believing that even a
trained analyst, without getting his subject for a prolonged period on
his couch, can hardly hope to penetrate the subconscious with certainty
on the dubious evidence of the written word and such things as choice
of imagery" (105). Their refusal to "psychoanalyse Richardson" makes
its case by invoking an original premise of psychoanalysis: dialogue.
Both parties of this transaction must be embodied and living
participants in the event. The psychoanalysis of a dead writer through
textual analysis by untrained analysts, here literary critics, is thus
understood to be essentially flawed from the outset because it
contradicts an essential premise of the method.
In the opening paragraph of their biography's central chapter on
Clarissa, Eaves and Kimpel identify the other school of criticism not
being used in this biography: "It is easy to find parallels to Richardson's
'ideas', about parents and children, for instance, or about marrying
rakes. But these are rather the things which limit Clarissa than the
things which make it important. If there are any literary critics left of
the school of Taine, they will have no difficulty in explaining many
things about Clarissa by the background of its author" (235). By
contrast with their dismissal of psychoanalysis (which turns out to be
prologue to an ongoing battle with this method and its practitioners
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whom they continue both to correct and borrow from) their battle
with the school of Hippolyte Taine is supposed to need no active
defense because virtually no disciples of the Tainean method remain.
Taine, author of Histoire de la litterature anglaise, (1863) De I'intelligence
(1870), and Origines de la France contemporaine (1875-94), proposed
three categories of influence and explanation in his theory of human
nature and development, race, milieu, and epoch. These categories for
defining and organizing evidence of historical scholarship are another
explanatory paradigm for the creative process. From Eaves and
Kimpel's agency-centered perspective Taine's categories for mapping
cultural creations, which, like psychoanalysis, posit determinism, are
inaccurate.
Throughout their life of Richardson, what is at stake for Eaves and
Kimpel is getting a grip on something they call "the usual mystery of
creation" (105, my emphasis). Freud and Taine had at stake, with equal
passion and centrality to their projects, a not dissimilar inquiry. Yet
one cannot imagine either of them writing the phrase "usual mystery of
creation." Pattern and repetition define Freud's and Taine's respective
notions of the creative process. For both these figures the process is
high drama. For Taine it is cultural-historical drama; for Freud, family
melodrama. But for neither is it the "usual mystery" of individual
agency. For them creativity is predetermined either within or outside
the creator. And thus biographers can read interior and exterior facts
of their subjects' lives as leading necessarily to the creator's creation.
Not so for Eaves and Kimpel, in whose agency-centered model of
creativity the creator's work is neither predetermined, predictable, nor
even in hindsight perceivable as leading necessarily to a particular
creation. Not even after the fact is there biographical omniscience. In
these biographers' ethos of agency and identity there remains forever
the (usual) mystery of creation.
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^ Some Discomforts
and One Historical Irony in
Eaves and Kimpel's Richardson: A Coda ^
There are moments in Eaves and Kimpel's Richardson, epitomized in
the passage below, when readers, in 2003, may feel uncomfortable; or
at any rate when this reader feels uncomfortable and perplexed, not
knowing whether to squirm, laugh, or utter an indignant harrumph.
These confused feelings seem to arise from a combination of
embarrassment for myself, for the biographers, and perhaps especially
for Richardson, who seems to be mis-served by all parties in the
biographical contract. Such moments, when one feels a historical
chasm opening between reader and biography, offer invaluable
opportunities for historical analysis and self-examination:
But the Pamela he caused to speak and write is a real woman,
and if one cannot forgive a woman for having a practical side,
for respecting and desiring money and rank, and even for
fooling herself into ignoring these motives in herself, then we
are all in a bad way.... Her 'hypocrisy' is the hypocrisy of all
of us: it arises from the discrepancy between the lofty view
of morality we are taught and at times believe in and the
double demand of society, for a propriety very different from
that morality and a worldly success often incompatible with
it. (104-105)
To the current generation of post-representational readers, the slurring
of differences among Pamela as verbal-cultural construct, or re
presentation, and "real woman" will almost undoubtedly sound naive,
dated, politically incorrect, or insensitive. The biographers' observation
about hypocrisy, particularly the repetition of this word, once with
quotation marks and once without, may sound preachy, a remnant of
latter-day Victorianism. And their assumption of global similarity (in
the phrase "all of us") about what may be merely a cultural convention,
an outdated one at that, may seem useless, at best, and positively
offensive, at worst.

"Eaves and Kimpel" Special Feature

355

However many times I read the sentence, "One cannot but
sympathize with [Pamela's] demand; even today, a young girl who does
not want to be raped ought not to be raped" (105), my difficulty and
incomprehension never lose their shock of surprise. What could these
writers mean by the phrase "even today".^ What could be the tone of
these words that combine a seemingly heartfelt emphasis with a
perturbing banality and sinisterness? And how could they write the
clause, "a young girl who does not want to be raped," unaware of its
syntactical inference that for young girls who do want to be raped, this
protective "ought not" does not pertain. Moments in the text that
produce forms of uneasiness such as these are distinct opportunities to
see this biography's historicity, the authors' autobiographical trace, or
both, because the times are no longer identical in assumption and
expression with our own.
This essay began with a brief discussion of the different contracts
of the longevity associated with biography and science, respectively. I
want to conclude by returning to this issue of longevity now applied to
Eaves and Klimpel's Richardson. The key terms of these biographers'
contract with the reader to describe this life and hence identify the
criteria by which it should be judged are the by now familiar trio:
"definitive," "exhaustive," and "rather old-fashioned." The first two
adjectives propose longevity and irreplaceability of their text,
something close to timelessness, achieved paradoxically through
painstaking immersion in the temporality of historical research. But
the third adjective invokes time emphatically, regress in time, to be
precise, as if this pair of biographer-fathers had dipped their offspring
'Plchi.rdson/Richardson in the river of eternal life, leaving only his (oldfashioned) heel unbathed. This old-fashionedness of their work centers
chiefly on their anti-Freudian position, argued continuously and
interwoven into the full fabric of their text. By contrast their
announced disagreement with the cultural-historical methodology of
school of Taine needs no defense. Taine is too passe to require their
adopting an old-fashioned position in order to oppose. Furthermore,
the inference seems clear that vis-a-vis the outmoded Taine, Eaves and
Kimpel's biographical method, far from being old-fashioned, is quite up
to date.
Here enters a circumstantial irony. For if psychoanalyses,
including anti- and post-Freudianisms, are still alive and relatively well
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in literary studies, they are not a dominant method. Rather it is
cultural studies, in the lineage of Taine, that dominates contemporary
theory and criticism. It is with cultural studies, the method that Eaves
and Kimpel dismissed, not psychoanalysis, against which they battled,
that their Richardson is now, perhaps, most out of step. Being antiFreud is now almost a non-issue, but not so being anti-cultural studies.
The years from 1957, when Eaves spent a year in England doing the
first full year's research for this biography, to 1971, when this life was
published, are a cusp in Euro-Anglo-American literary studies, theory,
and criticism. The work of Mikhail Bakhtin, Roland Barthes, Simone
de Beauvoir, Kenneth Burke, Michel Foucault, Claude Levi-Strauss, and
Susan Sontag, among others, was initiating fundamental rethinking of
the meanings of and relationships among identity, authority, and
cultural production that came to dominate the agenda and
methodologies of critical discourse over the next thirty years.
Eaves and Kimpel's Richardson, like Halsband's Montagu, is
doubtless here to stay. But it also seems highly likely that a new
scholarly life of Richardson will be written in the twenty-first century
to succeed and refocus, if not to replace, this life. It also seems likely
that the school of Taine, though by the name of cultural studies, which
Eaves and Kimpel dismissed, rather than the school of Freud, will tell
the story of this new and timely Richardson. And this new biography,
in order to make a place for itself in relation to its definitive, exhaustive,
and rather old-fashioned predecessor, will be required to take on, as
essential prologue to its task, an examination (and self-examination) of
agency in Eaves and Kimpel's biographical contract.

